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Take-home Final Examination

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Pol Sci 220  
Prof Haas

Very impressive.  
But the "solution"  
to be  
established  
immediately -  
which requires  
the first  
image.

Take-Home Final Examination

1. Vietnam and oppression of minorities

A linkage between the Vietnam war and the oppression of minorities - the Negro problem - in the United States is not an unusual proposition among those that follow Waltz's "second image" of International Relations, that relate international conflicts with the internal structure of the state. According to this approach, the main explanation for the external conflict should be sought not in the characteristics of the interaction patterns between the nations in conflict, or the international system as a whole, but rather as a consequence of the internal characteristics of the states.

Which of the two images is best, this or the third one, that consists exactly on considering that international conflicts are resultants from a state of international anarchy? We could suggest that there is no single answer to this question, it depends. It is possible to think that a "tight" international system does not leave much freedom of action for the actors, being so that each has to consider carefully the movents of the other and respond accordingly. In this sense there is a systemic logic that imposes itself upon the actors. However, in a loose system, the states have much more freedom of choice, and a logic of the system can only establish the general range of alternatives, or degrees of freedom, of each actor.

If this is so, we can start our discussion of the proposed linkage by asking whether the international system did not imposed upon the United States its present policy in Vietnam. This is, of course, the official rational: the United States had no choice but to respond aggression, avoiding a Munich and the consequences of the Domino process. And if the claims of the Vietnamese are correct, that they are simply responding to imperialist aggression,

the problem falls entirely within the logic of the "taired image": reciprocal perceptions, containment, equilibrium, and so on, with no place for internal questions.

But we can also say that this kind of systemic conflict is much more likely to occur among equals than in asymmetric relationships. It is clear that, for the Vietnamese, the only choice that ever existed was among different levels of resistance, while, for the United States, there was a choice of not starting the fight in the first place, and there is a new choice at each level of the escalation ladder. Again, at the official level, each decision is justified in terms of its necessity, as a function of the international situation, the cold war. But it is very clear that the official picture of the international system is rather a rationalization than a determinant of the American involvement in Vietnam. There is no need to discuss this point here, since it is openly recognized today, even in official circles, that the main reason why the United States is in Vietnam is because they are already there. What happened was just a successive accumulation of small steps, each of them avoidable in itself, having little to do with the global logic of the cold war, and the official appeal to the problems of the cold war worked, and still works, only as a protective ideological screen. The conclusion, thus, is that the Vietnam war is not something that was imposed upon the United States, but an action that has to be explained by the analysis of the motivations of this country. Which could be this motivation, in this case?

The linkage between internal oppression and external war is a commonplace among Marxists, in their interpretation of nationalism. According to it, nationalism is a phase of development of Capitalism that is still more acute than imperialism; while imperialism means to make war for keeping up the level of surplus-value, nationalism, and nationalist wars, is an attempt to avoid internal conflagration by direct appeal to irrational symbols and the stimulation of external conflicts.

This scheme was developed mainly to explain the European, fascist kind of nationalism, and was almost completely dropped with the emergence of nationalism in the underdeveloped world. In spite of these ideological contingences, this theory agrees with what is said in sociological theory about the effects of external conflict in the cohesion of groups (as in Simmel-Coser), or, on the other way round, about the mechanisms of generalized and transferred conflict behavior as a form of collective reaction to ~~tensions~~ tensions, as suggested by Smelser (in his Theory of Collective Behavior). The agreement does not go very far, since the sociological statements are based on observations of small groups, and do not apply necessarily to the behavior of nations. Besides, there is an specific element, nationalism, that is basic for the theory at the national level and does not enter at the small group level, at least in a first approximation.

Before continuing, we can anticipate the conclusion, that is negative: the supposed linkage between oppression of minorities and the Vietnam War does not stand up. Of course, being just one case under analysis, connections can be found between the phenomena. But, if "internal oppression" refers to the historical situation of the Negro, the argument is pointless: this situation is a constant in American history, and in consequence cannot explain variations in behavior. So, we take it as referring to the recent racial unrest. But, chronologically, the Korean war is previous to this unrest, and is, nevertheless, very similar to the present Vietnam war. The explanation must be common for both wars, and has to exclude the racial unrest, that is contemporary to just one of ~~them~~ them (We could accept, on the other hand, that the Vietnam war has some bearing in the present shaking of American society, of which the Negro problem is one aspect - but this is another question).

It is interesting to consider, at this point, what Schumpeter has to say about capitalism and Imperialism. He addresses himself to the question of why states engage in

"objectless " aggressive behavior - his Definition of Imperialism - and looks for the internal characteristics of the States that have this kind of behavior, in the best tradition of the "second image". Contrary to Lenin, for whom Imperialism is at the essence of Capitalism, Schumpeter states, quite flatly, the opposite: capitalists are "all inevitably democratized, individualized, and rationalized", and, in consequence, would never be interested on such an irrational behavior as imperialist warfare.<sup>(1)</sup> Because Imperialism is just a reminiscence of pre-capitalist problems and situations, that tend to vanish in a rational (e.g., capitalist) world: "The 'instinct' that is only 'instinct', that has lost its purpose, languishes relatively quickly in the capitalist world, just as does an inefficient economic practice" (2); "a purely capitalist world therefore can offer no fertile soil to imperialist impulses" (3). And, as an example of his thesis: "Among all capitalist economies, that of the United States is least burdened with precapitalist elements, survivals, reminiscences and power factors". Accordingly, "we can conjecture that among all countries the United States is likely to exhibit the weakest imperialist trend" (4).

It is not that Schumpeter is not aware of the problem of economic competition among national capitalisms. He takes them into account, and explains them as consequences of tariff barriers that could lead, indeed, to war among capitalist countries, according to good and rational reasons. But he takes pain to demonstrate that the establishment of economic barriers is irrational in the long run for all countries, and, since capitalists are democratized, individualized and rational, they will end up in a situation of open international market where peace will prevail.

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(1) Imperialism and Capitalism, p. 68.

(2) ibid., p.69

(3) ibid., p.69

(4) ibid., p.72.



here Schumpeter leaves the "second image" and appeals simultaneously to the first and the third ones: man is perfectible through Capitalism, and, when this perfection is obtained, rational interest will prevail, , objectless war will end, and there will be Peace. We can see in this a very curious lapsus: Schumpeter is well aware that there are rational wars, but he only admit them for the pre-capitalist countries. In a capitalist system, the assimilation is practically complete between imperialist, or "objectless" war, and war "tout court".

Perhaps the most important insight of Schumpeter's is the idea that war can, indeed, be carried on in a objectless way, and that we should look into the history of the imperialist country to understand the reasons for it. In general, his thesis is that some nations, or the ruling class of some nations, have sometimes to engage in wars, either for self-defense, or for a realistic objective. However, after the first objective is obtained, a war machine is created, a warrior habit is established, and then purposeless, imperialist war-making starts. In this point Schumpeter hesitates again sometimes imperialism is explained by "the necessities of its social structure, from the inherited dispositions of its ruling class", as in the case of absolutist France; but, when it comes to the capitalist regimes, these necessities of the social structure are nothing but instinctive reminiscences of a past era.

If we leave aside the appeal to "instinctive" elements, a sound proposition stands: war can be made not only for "the immediate advantages to be derived by conquest" (5), but for the solution of internal problems of the state that have little to do with the target of aggression.

Let us leave Schumpeter at this point, for a moment, and look to R. Tanter's attempt to find, as Rummel did before, the empirical dimensions of internal and external conflict behavior of nations, and their correlations (6).

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(5) ibid, p. 59.

A short summary both of Rummel's and Tanter's research is: they took dozens of indicators, factor-analysed them, and different factors of internal and external behavior came up. Since the orthogonal rotations were made separately for the internal and external factors, they were by definition independent from each other within each group. When he looks for correlations between the internal and the external group of factors, he finds none. The conclusion is that the thesis that internal conflict has to do with external ones, either as determinant or consequence (he makes the regression analysis in both ways) does not stand. Actually, Tanter finds some correlation when he introduces a time span among the indicators of the internal and external dimensions. But it is not a very high correlation, that does not mean very much in a context of general disconfirmation.

The outcome is meager, but not completely useless: the factor analysis gives the main dimensions that structure the plurality of discrete phenomena under observation, and opens the way to more specific analysis. After studies of this kind, the speculative question of the relations between "internal" and "external" conflict becomes a matter of the relations between "turmoil", "internal war" of a "subversive" or "revolutionary" types, in one hand (these are the internal conflict dimensions found by Tanter and Rummel) and a "diplomatic", a "belligerency" and a "war" factor, in the other.

The persistence of this outcome of lack of correlation (Sorokin came to the same many years before) rests strength to the general theory of linkage between internal and external conflicts. But we have another outcome from Tanter's factors, that is a basis for a further specification of the problem. Even if we accepted that the linkage exist, it does not have to lead, necessarily, to war. If the Negro unrest is a manifestation of "turmoil", we could imagine, for instance, that it would lead rather to "belligerence" than to war - and these are, by definition, independent dimensions.

We can tie up the argument now. First, we accept that the sheer logic of the cold war does not explain the war in Vietnam, we have to look for internal factors in the United States. Is it an imperialist war, in Lenin's sense? We would say no, since it is obvious that there is no material gain in the war, or at least the costs are much higher (a point could be made for the positive effects on the level of employment - but an intensive space program could have the same effect, with higher political gains). Is it then imperialist in Schumpeter's sense? We would say that it is not, insofar as we take Schumpeter's concept of imperialism as an "atavistic" phenomena. This atavism is, or would be, expressed in nationalist feelings and manifestations, and would lead to a stage of internal mobilization in the country. Only in this way can foreign conflict be used as a solution for internal tensions, since there is not much use in a scapegoat if it is not sufficiently explored. But even if this were the case, we could expect, in terms of Tanter, rather a stage of general belligerency than effective acts of war that are, actually, aimed to be limited and specific.

What we can take from Schumpeter is the suggestion that we must look for the specific institutions that, in the past, were developed for other, meaningful wars. The paradox, for the United States, is that this structure that remains fighting, as Schumpeter says, by the "objectless momentum of the machines in motion" (7), ~~is~~ not a legacy from the past, but from the future. This structure is at the same time military, industrial and bureaucratic, in one hand, and psychological on the other. It was developed for a kind of war that did not exist, that will perhaps never exist, but imposes a very rigid scheme of perception and patterns of reaction to the foreign policy-making.

It would be redundant to describe the automatisms of

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(6) Tanter, R. "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, March, 1966.

(7) Schumpeter, ibid., p.63



this machinery, from the CIA maneuvering to keep Diem in power, a minor operation, to half a million troops in defense of Ky. Instead, let us finish with Schumpeter's description of Roman imperialism:

"There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Roman's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest - why, then it was the national honor that had been insulted. The fight was always invested with an aura of legality. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs" (8).

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(8) Schumpeter, ibid. , p.51.

## 2. Systems

Landau's concept is very broad, and corresponds to what is rather known as "theory" ("a logic, an ordered set of relationships") than system. If we take the concept of system as a kind of heuristic device for theory formation, it does not fulfill the requisites of a theory - in this sense there are "systems" that are not included in Landau's concept. If, on the other hand, we take system as meaning a type of theoretical construct, then Landau's definition is not incorrect, but too general and inespecific. A system, for him, is essentially a systematic set of relationships, while, in the course, the concept was used to signify a set of relationships organized in a systemic way- and not necessarily very systematic.

The conceptual imprecision around the word "system" is such that nobody is quite happy with the concepts of the others, and each one offers his own concept or conceptual scheme. Adding to this, we can suggest that perhaps the best procedure is to spell out the different ideas, or dimensions, that are implicit, very often in an indifferenciated manner, behind the concept of system. These dimensions correspond to alternatives which, when combined logically, can give a defined map from which one could pick the concept that suits one best, or at least can help us to order the literature. We can identify the following ideas, or dimensions:

a) systematization: is the idea behind Landau's definition. Systematization is obtained when it is impossible to come to different conclusions either by deduction from the same set of <sup>in</sup>presumptions or by deduction from different presumptions that enter/the theoretical system. Besides this rule of compatibility of assumptions and logical consistency, a rule of completeness is also desirable, by which any statement regarding the phenomena covered by the theory can be said to be in agreement or in disagreement with it. Systematization is obtained when the presumptions are spelled out and the rules of deduction are defined.

b) realism: is the idea that the system exists in itself, as a being

to be studied ("realism" here is not the opposite of "idealism", but rather of "nominalism"). A system can "exist" either in an abstract, platonic manner, or very substantively "out there". In any case (and we would not enter in the complications of this distinction here) the central concepts here are:

1. the difference between living and non-living systems. A non living system is a section of the reality, defined by its boundaries. In this sense non-living systems are not "really" systems, since they do not exist otherwise than as conceptually. Living systems, however, define their own boundaries, are equipped for self-maintenance and auto-regulation. These are the other elements that enter in the characterization of living systems:
2. "life" and "death". A living system is "dead" when it is not able to keep its boundaries from blurring by entropic decay. The definition of what is life is becoming problematic even in biology, and in social sciences it is, of course, much more confusing. Two solutions are possible: The first is an intensional definition, a solution at the conceptual level - in social sciences, it becomes the question of attributes of the system. The other is extensional, less clear-cut and based on the observation of persistence of patterns of interaction among the elements of the system and between the system and the environment.
3. structures and functions: In biology, it is the distinction between anatomy and physiology. In social sciences it is not so clear, when, for instance, we say that "diplomacy is a structure for the stabilization function, which is in itself a structure for the maintenance of the attribute of equilibrium". We can see by this made-up statement that any pattern that contributes to the maintenance of other is a "structure" for this "function" - and the ultimate functions are the "attributes" of the system.

4. a whole that is distinct from the parts. The basic idea, here, is that the parts cannot be fully understood by themselves. Two emphasis are possible here: the one of the biologist, for whom the interest is the whole organism, and parts matter only as parts of the organism (which is also the orientation of the anthropologist when attempting to understand a cultural system),<sup>and</sup> the one of much of the International Relations theorists, for whom what matters are the parts (countries) and the system only as much as it has to be understood to explain what happens with the parts.

c) the computer as an analogy: the use of this analogy, or, in general, the use of conceptual tools that were developed by the computer sciences (servo-mechanisms, feed-back, and general information theory) characterize the more specifically "systemic" types of system analysis. It is this conceptual scheme that gave birth to general systems theorizing, and is widely used to characterize "real" systems. But the study of these real systems do not require, in general, the use of these concepts, as much as the use of concepts such as interdependence, feed-back, etc, can be used outside system analysis in the sense b.

d) analytical vs. empirical (or concrete) systems: concrete or empirical systems we consider those that are meant as adequate to reality, according to a given set of rules that control for non-accounted<sup>v</sup> variables. They are developed by empirical induction, and lead, in the social sciences, to probabilistic or imprecise statements. Analytical systems are deductive, derived, by more or less arbitrary rules, from more or less arbitrary assumptions, or rather presumptions. The aim is to be able to make analytical inferences that could lead to empirically valid statements, and this could be done if it were possible to develop empirical systems that could be isomorphic to analytical ones.

The relations between these 4 dimensions can be thought as

follows. First, things being as they are in social sciences, empirical systems are never fully systematic, nor are systematic systems concrete. The discussion that A.L. Burns makes of his own work in simulation is a good indication of it. Thus, we can identify analytical with systematic. Second, the computer analogy, as well as the biological and mechanic analogies from previous periods, can be used either in analytical or in empirical contexts, in realist or in non-realist theories. When used for non-realist theories, they simply help to understand patterns of relationship that do not add up to "real" systems. This is done very often when one uses a systemic or functionalist approach (rather than a systemic or functionalist theory) and, first, define arbitrarily a set of attributes, or high-level functions, and afterwards look for the attributes that are positively or negatively (functional or dysfunctionally) related to it.

We are now equipped with a typology that could be as follows:-

types of system theorizing

	<u>Analytical/ systematic</u>		<u>empirical</u>	
	<u>realist</u>	<u>non-realist</u>	<u>realist</u>	<u>non-realist</u>
<u>yes</u>	system's (simulation models)	(learning models)	K. Deutsch	(use of in- formation theory in linguistics)
<u>computer analogy:</u>				
<u>no</u>	(Caplan)	(axiomatic systems)	(classical functionalism)	(function- alist "approach")



George Liska (9) will fit, in our table, between the classical functionalism and the "functionalist approach". His analysis is empirical, in the sense that it aims to reproduce reality; and he does not use the computer analogy. He is not concerned with the international system in general, but only with one aspect of it, "the Politics and Organization of Security". The international system, for him, is a multiple equilibrium of "institutional, military-political and socio-economic factors", and international organizations enter as a part of this "dynamic interplay". (10)

He is realist, but in a very weak sense. International organizations exist, endowed with a reality that is not completely reducible to the sum of its components - but quite. This reality is extremely thin and unstable, since it depends, always, on the will of its parts - the nation-states - to keep on existing. So, he would say that, in general, equilibrium of an organization is an "equilibrium of wills", that remains only as far as "the actual readiness of members to perform correspond to their formal obligations". (11). To obtain this, a careful equilibrium has to be worked out in each aspect of the organization, regarding what is expected from an actor and what he wants to do. The structure has to be such that "the ratios between the national power and the institutional influence of individual member-states are not too disparate"; and its functional scope cannot exceed "the willingness of member states to yield the requisite measure of domestic jurisdiction" (12).

In terms of our four aspects of "real" systems, Liska's organizations are living systems that have "equilibrium" as the sole attribute. Actually, an organization could not work, being then technically "dead", if the willingness of the members to cooperate did not exist. What he calls "structure" and "function" are not the same as a more rigorous functionalism would do.

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(9) International Equilibrium, Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.

(10) op. cit., p. 15

(11) ibid., p. 14

(12) ibid., pp. 57-8 and 124

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More technically speaking, "structures" here are the agreements between right and might, dependence and carelessness, etc; and the functions of them, that is, the functions to which these structures serve, is equilibrium. Then there are some by-products, such as international cooperation in communications, trade-agreements, etc., that Liska calls "functions", but are rather goals, or purposes, of the institution. The weakness of his theoretical approach does not lie, however, on these questions of terminology, that are, after all, a matter of convention. The main problem is that he remains at a formal level that deals with organization as a purely voluntary system. It is impossible, with this framework, to look for the possible constraints that the system could have upon the actors, or, more generally, to the systemic determinants of actor's behavior.

K. Boulding, in Conflict and Defense, also works with the idea of parts playing - or fighting - against each other - but he analyses systematically the consequences of the interplay, and arrives to a systemic analysis that places him close to Caplan in our table. He does not attempt to construct an empirically based theory. He starts with a few presumptions - that each actor would eliminate the other if he could - define a few concepts in the simplest way he can, and then see which are the logical consequences of these assumptions. He is able, for instance, to present a recipe for stability, that is "to have a high cost of transport of violence, countries a long way apart, and rapidly diminishing efficiency with increase of scale" (13). This is a stability for a specific kind of international system, the "national defense" system..

Because Boulding, different from Liska, thinks in terms of variables, he does not remain at the level of general statements, but is equipped to say, after the above recipe, that "it is because of the failure of all three of (13) pp. 241/2

these conditions that we face an acute breakdown of the system of national defense in the world of today" (14). Now we have not only a definition of a system, based on concepts such as "home strength", "loss-of-strength gradient" and "sphere of influence", all precisely conceptualized, but also we know the limits of the system - when there <sup>(15)</sup>no home-strength that is bigger than the strength of the opposite at home - that is, when the other is stronger and the LSG ("loss-of-strength gradient") is minimal. He goes further on, and is able to discuss about the number of units that, in a stable system, can occupy a given closed area, such as a sphere. This number is a function of "c", that is LSG per mile, and "s", distance, between each pair of actors (15). Although he could not possibly make this calculus empirically, he is conceptually much better <sup>than</sup> Liska, who can talk on little more than the necessity of agreement between right and might.

In his chapter on the modifications and applications of the basic theory of international conflict, Boulding gives some insights into his conception of what "system" and "system theory" is. When he discusses the alternance between war and peace (which he compares with the economic cycles), he states that what we have are, really, two systems in alternance, a diplomatic and a war system. These systems are defined not extensionally, by their units (which are the same in both), but conceptually by their attributes, war and peace. And a final look on his conception of system analysis is given when he criticises Caplan. For him, what Caplan does is a taxonomy of types of national actors and patterns of choice - but Boulding's models "eventually abstract from the processes by which decisions are made, concerning on the great forces that effectively limit the field of decision" (16). These "great forces" are not something mystical, but the systemic result of the interaction of a set of units.

The third author we looked through, for this discussion on system, was H. Sprout, from the Geopolitics and Capability theorists. His work is big, heavy, detailed, erudite - and,

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intellectually poor, to say from the piece that was read more carefully (17). His theory, if the word can be used here, is that an actor has to behave according to the things he perceives, and the outcome of his acts are not a simple function of what he thinks <sup>they</sup> will be, but depends also on how things really are. Hence, the hybrid concept of "cognitive behavior", to mean that a person reacts to the milieu as he perceives it...

All this is very trivial, of course, and all depends on how ones use it. The Sprout's use it mainly for exhaustive descriptions of levels of capability, by geographic, military, and economic data. In terms of our typology, the work is obviously empirical, non-realist (there is no systemic concept) and uses no computer analogy. And since it does not include even heuristic concepts taken from systemic theory, perhaps it would be better placed outside our matrix. (Geopolitic theory, however, insofar as it is based on concepts of regional interdependence and geographic determinism, would fall in the "realist" category, together with classical functionalism in our trade.).

Very original  
and penetrating.  
A. Come and discuss  
with me.

(14) ibid., p.242

(15) ibid.

(16) ibid. p.275

(17) "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics",  
in Rosenau.



### 3. Middle-range theories.

The expression "middle-range theory" was, it seems, introduced by Merton, in the introduction of his Social Theory and Social Structure. As it is there, there is no clear-cut definition of what a middle-range theory might be, in terms of specific attributes. What there is, though, is a given conception of social sciences and the statement of a strategy for their development.

The conception of social sciences, or of sociology, more specifically, can be summarized as follows. Sociologists spend much of their time arguing about personalized "theories", or "schools". This is not good, first, because these are not theories, actually. A theory is a set of interrelated propositions that can be empirically verified, and the discussions about functionalism, marxism, the necessity of ideal types and "verstehen", etc., are about methodology, general theoretical orientations, concept formation, etc. - not seldom theory. Second, the situation is bad because, if we keep discussing about personalized schools, we shall never come down to business to make proper theory: "a science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost". But how to come down to business? Accepting the idea that our theories will be partial, and very often without connections with others, and leaving many sectors of reality unexplained. These theories will be of "middle-range", in two senses: they will be limited in scope, because many aspects of reality will have to be left outside; and they will be limited in generality, since it would be impossible to test it for all relevant cases. In short, the strategy for coming one day to big theory is to start now doing little theories, and accumulating data.

There are many flaws in this conception, that cannot be fully discussed here. We can indicate some of them, however. For one thing, there is not much evidence - and Merton offers none - that the accumulation of small theoretical *pieces* will lead eventually to the creation of big theory. Besides, the ideal "theory", as an interconnected set of verifiable propositions, is



seldom found in social sciences, and, when it is, the substantive content is in general trivial. Finally, it is not so clear that the aim of social sciences is to come to a stage of a mature and all-embracing theory. Perhaps Weber was right when suggested that social sciences are among those "to which eternal youth is granted"... (18)

So much against Merton. In his favor, let us say that his message, as a warning against excessive speculation and personalization of sociology, at a time when new techniques of social research were being developed and needed implementation, was and is still a valuable and relevant one! Let us define our concepts in a precise way, make our propositions in a way that can be tested empirically, and verified by others; let us be modest and self-conscious.

So, there are two conceptions of middle-range theory, a strong and a weak one. According to the strong version, there is no theory, in social sciences, that is not middle-range: "grand theories" are not theories, as a matter of fact. If we loosen the concept of theory, then middle range theories are those that are self-conscious of their limitations, and that tend towards empirically tested propositions.. The more the level of analysis is defined, the more the level of meaning is precise, the less sweeping are the generalizations, the more "middle-range" the theory is. In other words, in a field like international relations, where speculative theorizing is still strong, middle-range theorizing points to the scientific standards of the predictive mode.

There isn't much more to say about it at this level of generality. Let us examine a few authors.

Karl W. Deutsch (Nationalism and Social Communication, An inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality) could hardly be placed among the middle-range theorists, if by "middle-range" we mean either well tied-up theory or modesty of intent. In spite of that, there is no doubt that he must be placed at the "predictive" mode, far away from the emptiness of verbal speculation.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to summarise the

wealth of insights, hypothesis and lines of research that appear in this brilliant piece of work. What we can do is simply try to assess which kind of endeavour is he up to, and point out some of his contributions.

The main purpose of Deutsch's is not to make theory, but to suggest how theory can be made. This is done, by and large, showing how general and diffuse concepts can be thought in a precise, operational and testable way. So, he would define power, for instance, as "the probability of preserving the inner structure of one of the systems in a clash, with little or no relevant modification, at the price of bringing about relatively large modifications in the structure of the systems which clash with it" (19). Strength, he defines as "the capacity to "undergo the widest range of changes without losing its cohesion in a few essentials, so as to be able to include other patterns and structures within itself without losing its identity or its continued capacity for growth" (20).

This amazing capacity of operationalization (which is much more impressive in The Nerves of Government) is used to develop a "conceptual model" of the processes of nationalism and nationality. He does not come to a model, but to a set of operational, fruitful and "critical" concepts that are able to lead to it (21). The basic concept, "communication", is taken from general communications theory, as measurable in terms of bits of information. As far as people communicate, they are a community (easy, isn't?), and when this community is tied up with complementary habits and facilities (culture), embracing a large group of persons, we have a people. And nationality is defined as "a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members".

The usefulness of these definitions is that, with them, it is possible to talk about levels of community and complementarity, and measure them. Deutsch suggests different methods for testing

(18) Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Sciences and Social Policy",  
in Weber, The Methodology of Social Sciences, p.

(19) Deutsch, op. cit., p. 73

(20) ibid., p. 75.

his concept of nationality, in terms of the range of the communications network. The chapter 6 of the book, "national assimilation or differentiation", is perhaps the most interesting from the point of view of research, since it suggests specific quantitative measures of variables such as mobilization, assimilation and differentiation of large number of people.

The relevance of Deutsch's contribution can hardly be exaggerated, mainly in the field of the politics and sociology of national development. But what does all this have to do with International Relations?

It does in at least two senses. First, the analysis of the formation of "blocks of nationality", or nations, gives an empirical basis for the knowledge and prediction of the structure of the international system in terms of its units. In other words, it let us now how nations are created, which are the conditions for it, and how they enter in the international system. The same rational that leads to the study of integrated blocks of nationality, by national differentiation, can also be used for the study of national integration. This is done, for instance, when Deutsch discuss whether the different elements that enter in the formation of clusters of communication - language, values and belief, and communication channels - tend to correlate or not (the hypothesis being that a low level of correlation means blurred boundaries, cross-pressures and loyalties, and non-disruptive conflicts). The second sense that it relates to international relations is that, with this approach, the international system can be seen as a stratified set of actors, with channels of mobility and some patterns of behavior (nationalism as one), and so on.

Is Schelling (The Strategy of Conflict) a middle-range theorist? Only in the sense that he does not belong to the "grand theory" tradition, to the speculative mode. He does not talk about "conflict" as an all-embracing concept - he defines precisely what he means by it, in its diverse meanings, and proceeds to examine in detail how strategic conflicts are developed, which variables are taken into account by the parts, what means "to win" a conflict, etc. Of course, his work does not aim to explain "everything", not even every kind of conflict (he expressly excludes non-rational, or irrational conflicts - whatever that means). But he works at a very high level of generality, that intends to cover, with the same conceptual scheme, both his conflict with his son and a system of nuclear deterrence.

Schelling work occupy a very interesting intermediate position between the formalized, deductive game theory and the more empirical (in general psychologic) approach to problems of conflict. What he does, at the beginning, is to expand the definition of a game, basically by introducing mixed-motive situations, where the parts share some common interests. Out of the two-actors - zero-sum-game, he soon finds that the formalization of the game, and the search of its "solution", or saddlepoint, is either impossible or not very relevant.

The first difficulty is with the concept of rationality. A "rational" behavior, for Schelling, (the quotation marks are his) consists of a "calculating, value-maximizing strategy of decision" (p.17). In a simple game with a saddle-point, it is always possible to compare the outcome of a real game with the logical solution, and this is a test of rationality. What can be done, however, when there is no such solution? And the solution does not exist, among other things, because of the array of tricks that may or may not be used by the actors, in the bargaining process. Threats, promises, tacit negotiations, all the techniques of assuring reliability of



threat (including "irrational" behavior of various kinds), can enter in the game with different timing, with outcomes that depend on the communications and enforcement structures, and on the common cultural grounds that allow for tacit negotiations. Even in cases where a "solution" exists (and a condition for this is that the parameters of the game remain constant), the details of the process are lost. With Schelling's own words, "while it is instructive to see how such tactics as threats, commitments, and promises can be absorbed into an enlarged, abstract "supergame" (game in the 'normal form'), it should be emphasized that we cannot learn anything about those tactics by studying games that are already in normal form" (22)-.

Schelling cannot predict the outcome of conflicts, nor can he suggest the best way of carrying them. What he can do is to define the variables that enter, the tactics that are available to the players (and it would be desirable if these tactics were presented in a more systematic way), the necessity and types of underlying assumptions that enter in limited conflicts, etc. These concepts structure the field for the conduct of empirical research, to determine both the elements that enter at play in a conflict situation and the motives and psychological mechanisms that underlie the different tactics and strategies by the different types of actors.

Studies of federalism and integration fall more comfortably in the category of middle-range theories. More down-to-earth, they tend, in general, to find the specific mechanisms that lead to a specific kind of phenomena, integration. Since there is no room here for the exam of a major work in this field, let us see what A.H. Birch has to say in his article on "Approaches to the Study of Federalism" (23).

He lists four types of approach, "institutional", "sociological", "federalism as a process" and "federalism as a bargain".

(22) Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 156.



Then he takes three of these approaches and submit them to what he considers to be an empirical test. He takes Deutsch (of Political Community in the North Atlantic Area) as the "process" theorist, that has, according to Birch, 9 criteria for integration (distinctive way of life, different expectations, increase in capability, previous system of communications, etc.). Then K.C. Wheare, comes as representative of the "institutional approach", with six criteria of which three are "hopes" and the other three have to do with proximity and some similarity, and previous contact. Riker, with two criteria of interests, is the representative of the "bargain" approach.

The conclusion he comes to is that the institutional approach is the best, and Deutsch's is clearly the worst. He does it by comparing actual cases of federation with the criteria of the three authors, and find that Deutsch's criteria does not fit any of them, in their totality. Unfortunately, history seemed to be against Birch: Singapore left Malaya even before the article was finished, and Nigeria, we all know today, is not a very good example of a successful federation. The East African federation never came to existence.

Birch's mistake, is easy to see now, was to think on a purely formalistic way - of course that formal criteria are useful for defining a formal federation! - But he does not have anything else to say, whereas a more empirical analyst with knowledge of the situation could predict, perhaps, the prospects of Nigeria or Malaya. But this demands both more modest and more deep analysis than the definition of a list of criteria.

What about Peace Research? How does it fit regarding the concept of "middle range"? There is no clear answer to that, as much as there are all kinds of "peace researchers". Amitai Etzioni (The Hard Way to Peace) is concerned with Peace all right, but not very much with Research, in this work. What he intends to do

(23) Political Studies, Feb. 1966.